Of course, other commentators have offered various Spinozistic responses to the Leibnizian objection with varying degrees of confidence and conviction, 5 but it is not my aim here to survey and assess them. Rather than show its merits by contrasting it critically with competing suggestions, I hope to motivate the defence of NSA that I offer on Spinoza's behalf by showing it to be consonant with both Spinoza's overall metaphysics and his general philosophical orientation, in particular his commitment to the guiding Principle of Sufficient Reason, hereafter PSR. 6 Put simply, PSR holds that there are no brute facts; according to it, if it is fact that p, there must be some explanation for this fact. Spinoza treats PSR as axiomatic:
'What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself' (IA2).
He draws out the implication of this, in a more explicit endorsement of PSR, when he writes, 'For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, both for its existence and for its nonexistence' (IP11d). As I hope to show, it is PSR that ultimately lies behind NSA.
The Leibnizian objection
In short, Spinoza's argument for substance monism runs as follows:
There cannot be two or more substances with the same attribute.
(2) There necessarily is a substance with infinite attributes.
Therefore, there necessarily is only one substance.
(1) is, of course, just NSA. It is worth noting that NSA also props up (2) , which Spinoza reaches in IP11: 'God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists'. Very roughly, the argument for (2) By way of response, the Leibnizian points out that one might reject the operative assumption and allow instead that each substance might have more than one attribute. In that case, two substances, A and B, could share an attribute, X, but be distinguishable in virtue of the fact that B has a further attribute, Y, which A lacks.
This would be an instance of distinct substances with the same attribute, contrary to NSA.
Moreover, the objection continues, Spinoza himself allows that a substance might have more than one attribute. It 'is far from absurd', he says, 'to attribute many 5 attributes to one substance' (IP10). Indeed, in arriving at (2) above, Spinoza does precisely this, attributing to a substance infinite attributes (see IP11)! Hence, he has no resources to deny the possibility of the scenario just sketched.
Spinoza has, the Leibnizian concludes, not given us a reason to accept NSA and cannot do so, unless he relinquishes other claims that one can safely assume he will not be prepared to give up.
If the Leibnizian objection cannot be answered, then Spinoza's commitment to substance monism, and with it his entire philosophical edifice, would appear to stand on shaky foundations, or to stand on no foundations at all.
A Spinozistic reply
In this section, I shall offer a response to the Leibnizian objection, drawing only on (ii) For Spinoza, the nature of another substance, C, could not prevent A from having Y. In order to do so, C would need a further attribute, Z, not shared by A, which would prevent A from having Y.
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In the first instance, and quite apart from PSR-inspired calls for an explanation as to why A should lack Z, this proposal faces the familiar dilemma. Either A's lacking Y is to be explained by reference to C's having Z, in which case Y cannot be an attribute, or Y is an attribute, in which case A's lacking Y cannot be explained by reference to C's having Z.
In addition, (ii) faces a more serious problem that did not arise with respect to (i). Suppose that C's possessing Z prevents A's possessing Y. In that case, one could not grasp the nature of A-that is, understand why A is as it is-without reference to the nature of C. But that would disqualify A from being a substance since, for Spinoza, a substance 'is in itself and is conceived through itself' (ID4). So, if A should turn out not really to be a substance, it evidently could not be a substance that shares an attribute with another substance.
(i) and (ii) appear to exhaust the possible explanations for why A has only attribute X while B has both attributes X and Y. In the absence of such explanations, 
Conclusion
Having outlined the notorious Leibnizian objection to NSA, I developed a reply to that objection, one which has the following advantages. First, it draws exclusively on ideas that Spinoza advances prior to the introduction of NSA in IP5; that is, it exploits no claims that Spinoza develops later in The Ethics (which in many cases would depend on, and so could not be invoked to support, NSA). Second, it makes no use of extraneous assumptions that would be foreign to Spinoza's philosophy or that are not available to him, given his theoretical commitments. Third, relatedly, and perhaps most importantly, the reply accords very much with the spirit of Spinoza's rationalist philosophy, at the heart of which lies an unwavering commitment to PSR.
The claim is not, of course, that the proffered reply corresponds to anything in the argument that Spinoza actually offers in support of NSA (it evidently does not).
Rather, the claim is that it is in no way forced upon or alien to Spinoza's extant remarks and builds upon no materials not already present. Of course, it might be the case that Spinoza had such a line of thought in mind all along. If that were true, it would be nice, but there is need to engage in such speculation.
Given how central NSA is to Spinoza's argument for substance monism, and given how Spinoza's version of substance monism constitutes the foundation for all that follows in The Ethics, identifying a response to the Leibnizian objection that might bolster Spinoza's commitment to NSA is a pressing task for anyone who wants
